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ABSTRACT
Pretrial diversion programs have the potential to prevent future criminal
behavior through intervention and community based services. This may be
particularly true for specific populations of offenders such as those with mental
illness, substance abuse disorder, and those with co-occuring disorders. Pretrial
diversion programs take low-level offenders out of the jail population, both
reducing system overpopulation and costs of incarceration. The programs also
provide speedy case processing for minor crimes resulting in savings to the
court system and personnel. Pretrial diversion can help an offender avoid a
criminal conviction and potentially avoid future criminal violations. Results
indicate that most Anchorage pretrial defendants comply with and complete
the pretrial conditions in a very short time period, an additional savings in case
processing time. This research details the initial assessment of the Anchorage
Municipal Prosecutor Pretrial Diversion program. This assessment examines
system savings in time and money, as well as policy implications for the justice
system that may assist other jurisdictions as they consider implementing a
pretrial diversion program.
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INTRODUCTION
Alaska is in severe financial distress, and figuring out how to
effectively and efficiently administer the justice system with less funding
presents a myriad of difficult decisions. Shrinking oil production on
Alaska’s North Slope, combined with plummeting oil prices, have made
for “a state budget crater of crisis proportions.” 1 This practicum
highlights the results of a recent assessment of the Municipality of
Anchorage’s pretrial diversion program as an example of a small but
hopeful cost-savings option for Alaskan communities. Financial crises
oust us from comfort zones, force careful examination and prioritization,
and necessitate adaptation. One change worth careful consideration is
increased use of pretrial diversion alternatives. This practicum details the
results of a recent effort to assess Anchorage’s pretrial diversion program
and its potential for resource savings. Anchorage’s program is modest, in
that it only addresses a handful of non-violent violations and does not
take on the laudable goals of treatment of offenders or the restoration of
specific victims. Yet as our findings indicate, the program is a wise fiscal
strategy that spares valuable justice system resources and helps citizens
avoid the collateral consequences of a conviction on one’s record.
Funding Alaska’s justice system is a costly endeavor. Expenditures
for the major justice agencies such as the Department of Corrections,
Department of Public Safety, Department of Law, Alaska Court System,
Public Defender Agency, and Office of Public Advocacy make up about
9% of Alaska’s total state agency spending. 2 As state revenues were
plentiful from 2000–2010, Alaska’s justice system expenditures grew in
lock step with growth in the total state operating budget. 3 Part of the
growing justice expenses resulted from more certain prosecution and
increasingly punitive sentencing policies. This caused inmate populations
to rise. The combined jail and prison population has grown 27% over the
past decade, fueling increased corrections spending by 60% in twenty
years. 4 It is not just correctional costs that have risen. Between fiscal year

1. Kirk Johnson, Alaska’s Schools Face Cuts at Every Level Over Oil Collapse,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/us/oilcollapse-drains-alaskas-wide-ranging-education-system.html?_r=0.
2. Justice Ctr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, Justice System Operating
Expenditures, 26(1) ALASKA JUST. F. 2, 2 (2009).
3. See id. The total operating budget in FY 2000 was $3,513,383,100 and in FY
2010 was $6,138,365,300. Id.
4. Public Safety in Alaska, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (July 15, 2015),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/factsheets/2015/07/public-safety-in-alaska (last updated July 12, 2016).
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(FY) 2000 and FY 2010, Alaska’s Department of Law and Public Defender
Agency operating budgets more than doubled as well. 5
In 2014, the Alaska Legislature created a thirteen-member Alaska
Criminal Justice Commission (ACJC) tasked with evaluating system
practices and making recommendations to improve criminal laws and
practices with an eye toward public safety, offender rehabilitation, victim
restitution, and overall cost reduction. 6 Because of the budget situation,
cost reduction has occupied center stage in all relevant discussions. Once
the ACJC assembled, it fashioned workgroups to review specific stages in
the criminal process, and continues to engage in deep exploration and
discussion about policies and practices in Alaska and their impacts on the
above goals. Early in 2015, the ACJC saw the need and advisability of
joining with PEW Charitable Trust’s Public Safety Performance Project.
The State partnered with researchers from PEW and entered a justice
reinvestment initiative wherein the State has agreed to follow the research
findings by taking funds from less effective policies and programs and
reinvesting those funds into more promising endeavors. 7 In December
2015, the ACJC provided a comprehensive set of policy recommendations
to the Alaska Legislature. 8 Major reforms that were proposed include
using evidence-based pretrial practices, prioritizing prison and jail space
for serious and violent offenders, strengthening community supervision
programs, ensuring oversight and accountability, and expanding crime
victims’ rights. 9 Senate Bill 91 followed on the heels of the ACJC’s
recommendations. 10 This Bill seeks sweeping changes and incorporates
many, but not all, of the ACJC’s recommendations. Governor Walker
signed the Bill into law on July 11, 2016. 11
Alaska is not alone in its challenge to provide a workable justice
system amidst shrinking budgets. Growing corrections populations,
larger court dockets, and more former prisoners returning to their
communities have forced numerous jurisdictions to become “laboratories
5. See Justice Ctr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, supra note 2.
6. ALASKA CRIM. JUSTICE COMM’N, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/alaskacriminal-justice-commission (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
7. See ALASKA CRIM. JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT 1, 14
(Dec. 2015), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/imported/acjc/
recommendations/ak_justice_reinvestment_intiative_report_to_acjc_12-9.pdf.
8. See id.
9. Id. at 14.
10. See 29th Legislature (2015–2016): Full Text of SB 91, ALASKA STATE
LEGISLATURE, http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_fulltext.asp?session=29&
bill=SB91 (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).
11. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Walker Signs Historic
Criminal
Justice
Reform
Bill
(July
11,
2016),
http://gov.alaska.gov/newsroom/2016/07/governor-walker-signs-historiccriminal-justice-reform-bill/.
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for innovative programs and collaborative problem-solving
approaches.” 12 Growing research shows these alternative approaches can
reduce crime, promote better victim services, and increase public trust
and faith in the justice system. 13 And many of these approaches rely on
the well-established concept of pretrial diversion. 14 Pretrial diversion
programs divert certain defendants away from traditional criminal justice
proceedings into other case resolution alternatives such as community
treatment programs. Most pretrial diversion programs are designed to
address factors contributing to criminal behavior, provide a source of
restitution to specific victims or the community, reduce costly
prosecution and drains on court resources, and free defendants from the
collateral effects of having convictions on their records. 15
In this practicum, we focus on pretrial diversion by providing some
general characteristics of pretrial diversion programs in the United States,
recounting the history and extremely limited use of pretrial diversion in
Alaska, and then presenting the findings from a recent assessment of the
Municipality of Anchorage’s pretrial diversion program. We conclude by
highlighting the success of the program, discussing some limitations
regarding the evaluation, and sharing some considerations for future
development of pretrial diversion programs in Alaska.

I.

HISTORY OF PRETRIAL DIVERSION

Pretrial diversion programs vary in name and structure but share
several common characteristics. These programs often seek to modify
behavior and include drug and alcohol treatment, psychological
counseling, behavioral management sessions, vocational training,
community service, and required restitution payments. Programs
typically use established eligibility criteria based upon the offender’s
characteristics and his or her perceived treatment needs (gleaned from
assessment tools), as well as the type of crime committed. Diversion can
occur at various stages in the life of a case, but as its name denotes,
diversion occurs prior to conviction. Finally, prosecution is held in
abeyance, and successfully completing the terms of the diversionary
12. NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, PROMISING PRACTICES IN
PRETRIAL
DIVERSION
4
(2010)
[hereinafter
NAPSA],
https://netforumpro.com/public/temp/ClientImages/NAPSA/20b9d12660bd-421a-bcbf-1d12da015947.pdf; see also ALASKA CRIM. JUSTICE COMM’N, supra
note 7, at 5.
13. NAPSA, supra note 12, at 4.
14. Id.
15. See id. See also CATHERINE CAMILLETTI, PRETRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAMS:
RESEARCH SUMMARY 1–2 (Oct. 25, 2010), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/
PretrialDiversionResearchSummary.pdf.
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program usually results in dismissal of the charges. 16 Pretrial diversion is
an attractive alternative because it provides powerful incentives to
defendants, focuses on conditions driving criminal behavior, and diverts
people out of an over-taxed case processing system.
A.

Pretrial Diversion in the United States

According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
as of May 13, 2015, forty-four states statutorily provide some form of
pretrial diversion alternatives. 17 Thirty-seven states have programs
created to address the needs of specific defendant populations, such as
substance abuse or mental illness. 18 These programs often utilize
treatment or therapeutic court processes and programs that divert
defendants away from court into community-based programs. 19 Twentysix states have statutory authorization for general population diversion. 20
These programs address the general needs of all defendants and typically
have some eligibility criteria, such as diverting only first-time offenders
and misdemeanor offenses. 21
Pretrial diversion programs grew, particularly in the 1970s, and by
March 1977, about 248 intervention/diversion type projects operated in
thirty-seven states. 22 States began passing laws to explicitly allow pretrial
diversion programs, and several professional pretrial associations were
organized, such as the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies
(NAPSA) and the Pretrial Justice Institute (PJI). 23 As NAPSA created
pretrial diversion standards, hundreds of programs sprung up across the
country. It was during this decade that the National Advisory
16. Amber Widgery, Pretrial Diversion, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May
13, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrialdiversion. Programs can offer diversion into other alternatives pre-plea or postplea. NAPSA, supra note 12, at 5–6. The National Association of Pretrial Services
prefers the use of voluntary pre-plea programs to post-plea options. See id. at 5. In
post-plea programs, pleas and convictions must be vacated rather than simply
having the charges dismissed. Id. at 5–6.
17. Widgery, supra note 16.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. JOHN CLARK, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL PRETRIAL
DIVERSION IN THE AGE OF SPECIALTY TREATMENT COURTS: EXPANDING THE RANGE OF
PROBLEM-SOLVING OPTIONS AT THE PRETRIAL STAGE 5 (2007); Chris Cobb, Pretrial
Intervention Project Begins in Anchorage, 2(6) ALASKA JUST. F. 2, 2–3 (1978),
https://www.uaa.alaska.edu/academics/college-ofhealth/departments/justice-center/alaska-justiceforum/02/06jul1978/b_pretrial.cshtml.
23. CLARK, supra note 22, at 5.
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Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended
pretrial diversion programs for all jurisdictions. 24
B.

Pretrial Diversion in Alaska

Alaska is one of only six states without a statute on pretrial
diversion. 25 While statutory authorization is not required to exercise the
discretionary function of law enforcement and prosecution, clear
codification helps cement a climate of alternative case processing, breaks
through vacillating administrative ideologies about proper forms of
punishment and accountability, and can establish uniformity across local
jurisdictions. Despite a lack of statutory direction, Alaska has some
experience with pretrial diversion at both the state and community level.
i.

The Statewide Pretrial Intervention Program

The Alaska Department of Law first experimented with pretrial
diversion in 1978 when it started the Pretrial Intervention Program in
Anchorage. 26 This pilot project targeted first-time property offenders with
no history of violence and who were not dependent upon drugs or
alcohol. 27 The program focused on direct restitution to specific victims,
community service, and compliance with a performance contract that
offenders and other relevant parties developed. 28 Both State of Alaska and
Anchorage municipal prosecutors made referrals to this program. A
favorable evaluation of the first year led the Alaska Legislature to fund a
statewide pretrial intervention program in FY 1981, which extended by
1983 to the communities of Barrow, Bethel, Fairbanks, Juneau, Kenai,
Nome, Valdez, Ketchikan, Kodiak, Sitka, Dillingham, and Palmer. 29
As the statewide pretrial diversion program expanded, it sought to
provide (1) viable alternatives to formal processing within defined
guidelines, (2) rehabilitative services to defendants charged with nonserious offenses, and (3) restitution either to the victim directly with
24. Id.
25. Widgery, supra note 16. Technically, Alaska has a statutory diversion
program for juvenile offenders called Youth Court, which allows dismissal of
charges for applicable cases. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.400 (2016) (allowing
diversion of juveniles alleged to have committed misdemeanors to local Youth
Courts).
26. See N.E. SCHAFER, ALASKA JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS UNIT, JUSTICE
CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE, EVALUATION OF THE ALASKA PRETRIAL
INTERVENTION PROGRAM 12 (1988), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/acjc/
pretrial%20diversion/interprogram1988.pdf.
27. Cobb, supra note 22.
28. Id.
29. SCHAFER, supra note 26, at 13.
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monetary reimbursement or to society generally through community
service. To avoid net-widening, the program guidelines prevented nonprosecutable cases from program referral, and the program had extensive
evaluation capabilities built in from the beginning. 30 And while intake
guidelines permitted referral of felons and those with prior records, the
program was primarily intended for those charged with non-serious first
offenses. 31
Nancy Schafer, a University of Alaska Anchorage justice researcher,
conducted a grant-funded evaluation of program outcomes from 1983 to
1986. Schafer’s findings revealed a promising program and a unique
opportunity to study diversion as it operates in different localities under
uniform guidelines. Unlike site-specific programs that often vary in
policy and practice, Alaska’s statewide program allowed both
comparisons among different program sites operating under the same
policies, as well as assessment of how prosecutors and program staff
adapted the policies to meet local concerns. Such assessment is important
to Alaska, which has communities that are distinctly different in size,
accessibility, race, and ethnicity. For example, the statistics showed that
Fairbanks made the greatest use of pretrial diversion, but used it
predominately for underage drinking cases. 32
Schafer’s evaluation showed that the most common offense
categories referred for pretrial diversion were theft, including theft in the
second degree, theft in the third degree, and shoplifting offenses, drug
offenses in the third and fourth degrees, burglary/trespass, assault, and

30. Id. at 12. This so-called “net-widening” effect describes the situation when
changes in justice system processes and procedures result in a more individuals
controlled by the criminal justice system instead of less. Matthew C. Leone, NetWidening, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & PUNISHMENT 1087–88 (ed. David Levinson),
http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/crimepunishment/n286.xml (last visited Mar.
20, 2017). Some fear that diversion programs result in sanctions imposed on those
(especially youth) who otherwise would never have experienced any formal or
informal sanctions. Instead of reducing those under official supervision, a worry
is that diversion alternatives increase those under supervision and subject to
increased punishment for violations of the conditions of diversion. Christopher
Bright, Lesson 5: Implementation Issues – Net-widening or Diversion?, CTR. FOR JUSTICE
&
RECONCILIATION,
http://restorativejustice.org/restorative-justice/aboutrestorative-justice/
tutorial-intro-to-restorative-justice/lesson-5-implementation-issues/diversionor-net-widening/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
31. Id. at 26. However, it is clear that not just “easy” cases were “cherrypicked,” because 36.8% of the participants were charged with felonies and 36.3%
were not first-time offenders. See id.
32. Id. at 31.
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underage drinking. 33 These accounted for 75% of all program referrals,
with the majority being crimes against property or public order. 34
Some criminologists and justice officials worry that instead of a
reduction of individuals entering the justice system, diversionary
programs discriminate against minorities and lead to net-widening. 35
Schafer’s evaluation showed that the statewide program did neither.
Referral decisions did not appear to be racially motivated or
discriminatory. If anything, minorities like Alaska Natives were given the
pretrial diversion option in excess of their percentage of the total
population. Also, except for minor consuming alcohol cases, the program
did not result in net-widening, as prosecutors ensured referrals were
limited to “prosecutable” cases. 36 Program guidelines allowed for referral
of felony cases and defendants with prior records, but the program was
primarily intended for non-serious first offenses. Schafer’s results showed
36.8% of those in the program were charged as felons, suggesting the
program did in fact serve as an alternative to more severe sanctions,
rather than a new option for those who would otherwise have avoided
sanction. 37 Furthermore, 36.3% of participants had prior criminal
histories. 38 These numbers show that diversion was functioning as an
alternative to more severe sanctions and minimized penetration into the
criminal justice system 39—the goals of pretrial diversion.
Substance abuse treatment was required in about half of the referrals
because most of the participants were under the influence of alcohol or
drugs at the time of their offense. 40 About 65% of program participants
successfully completed their performance contracts, and the remainder
was a mixture of partial completion or no participation. 41
Impact on future criminality (also known as recidivism) is
important. Approximately one-third of the participants were rearrested
33. Id. at 27–28.
34. Id. at 28–29.
35. CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, WIDENING THE NET IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND THE DANGERS OF PREVENTION AND EARLY INTERVENTION 1 (2001),
http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/widening.pdf; OJJDP, Diversion
Programs
an
Overview,
Juvenile
Justice
Bulletin
(Sept.
1999),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9909-3/div.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2017);
Traci Schlesinger, Racial Disparities in Pretrial Diversion: An Analysis of
Outcomes Among Men Charged with Felonies and Processed in State Courts, Race
and Justice 3(3), 210, 223-27 (2013), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/
10.1177/2153368713483320 (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
36. See id. at 29.
37. Id. at 26.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 27.
40. Id. at 33.
41. Id.

34.1 ARTICLE - LEPAGE & MAY (DO NOT DELETE)

5/1/2017 2:22 PM

2017 THE ANCHORAGE PRETRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM 9
for any offense between two years and four and one-half years after they
were admitted into the program, mirroring the recidivism rates in other
states’ pretrial diversion programs. 42 This 33% rate was, and would
continue to be, much lower than the criminal recidivism rate for all adult
offenders in Alaska, which is about 65%. 43 Schafer also found that age was
the strongest predictor of rearrest. 44 Offenders under age twenty-five
were twice as likely to be rearrested as those over age thirty-five. 45 Also,
females in the program were rearrested at a rate about 10% less than
males, and those without a high school diploma or its equivalent
recidivated at a rate of about 40% compared to the 30% with a high school
diploma. 46 Race also seemed to be associated with rearrest: Alaska
Natives and blacks were rearrested more often than whites, but Shafer
believed this may have been more of a rural versus urban distinction than
an indicator of discrimination. 47 In Shafer’s sample, nearly 52% of the
Alaska Natives lived in rural areas, whereas only about 21% of the whites
lived in rural areas. 48
Despite the fact that the program was meeting its objectives, the
statewide pretrial diversion program was “phased out” by the
Department of Law in 1986 during Alaska’s last major oil recession. 49 This
is ironic because of the financial benefits of diversion programs. 50
Ultimately, 1,964 cases entered the pretrial intervention program before it
was discontinued. Resource savings do not appear to have been a
program goal, because it did not surface as a data point in evaluation
tools. For example, Schaffer’s 1988 evaluation did not measure the extent
42. Id. at 35.
43. The recidivism in Alaska peaked in 2007 at 66%. Some believe the rate
grew as the Murkowski administration sought to eliminate reformative programs
offered by the Alaska Department of Corrections. The 2015 Alaska Recidivism
Reduction Plan notes that recidivism dropped to 63.19% in FY 2011 as these
programs started to return. THE ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 2015 RECIDIVISM
REDUCTION PLAN: COST-EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO SLOW PRISON POPULATION GROWTH
AND REDUCE RECIDIVISM, at ii, http://www.correct.state.ak.us/commish/docs/
hb266.pdf.
44. SCHAFER, supra note 26, at 37.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 39–40.
48. Id. at 40.
49. See id. at 14 (noting the Pretrial Intervention Program was ended in 1986
because of a statewide economic depression).
50. Kwixuan Maloof, The Recorder: Expand Diversion to Save Money and
Lives, San Francisco Public Defender (Feb. 26, 2010); Mark S. Waller et al., Testing
the Cost Savings of Judicial Diversion, Center for Court Innovation & NPC Research,
45-49 (Mar. 2013), http://www.pretrial.org/download/diversion/Testing
%20the%20Cost%20Savings%20of%20%20Judicial%20Diversion%20%20Center%20for%20Court%20Innovation%20et%20al%202013.pdf20of% (last
visited Apr. 7, 2017).
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to which cost savings to the State of Alaska were realized. We can only
speculate on the degree, if any, that this statewide program saved judicial
and prosecutorial resources.
ii.

The Municipality of Anchorage Pretrial Diversion Program

Anchorage reinstituted pretrial diversion alternatives in the mid1990s when it codified a pretrial diversion program in the Anchorage
Municipal Code (AMC Section 08.05.060). 51 It is a modest effort that refers
fewer types of cases and offenders into the program than the earlier
statewide program. Primarily, Anchorage seeks to divert first-time
offenders in a specific range of minor offenses from traditional case
processing. The Municipal Code states that pretrial diversion is available
for any criminal or traffic offense except for those specifically identified.
Diversion is not currently available for crimes against persons, weapon
crimes, crimes harmful to minors, gambling, prostitution, and offenses
related to driving under the influence. 52
Defendants are offered pretrial diversion independent of whether
they are in custody or not. 53 The Municipality operates three kinds of
diversion: pre-charge, pretrial, and deferred sentencing. 54 Under
Anchorage Municipal Code Section 08.05.060, pretrial diversion
agreements typically require the defendant to pay a fine or do community
work service (CWS). 55 Pretrial diversion participants are usually expected
to complete their conditions within one month. 56 Community work
service is not usually an option offered for thefts over $100 since one hour
of CWS equates to $6.25, and completion of the requisite number of hours
would be hard to achieve within a month. 57 The Municipality obtains
fines from all three diversion programs. 58

51. Anchorage Mun. Code § 08.05.060 (2016).
52. Id.
53. ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, SENTENCING AND ALTERNATIVES
WORKGROUP PROPOSALS TO THE COMMISSION FOR RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING:
PRETRIAL DIVERSION AND DEFERRED PROSECUTION 18 (Apr. 25, 2015),
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/acjc/proposals/ptd-dis4-15.pdf.
54. Id. at 19.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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II. EVALUATION OF THE ANCHORAGE PRETRIAL
DIVERSION PROGRAM
Pretrial diversion programs have operated successfully at the
federal, state, and local levels for years, so it is not surprising that early
into the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission (ACJC) review process, the
Sentencing Alternatives Workgroup began exploring the use of pretrial
diversion programs as a cost-effective alternative to typical case
processing for certain crimes. 59 The Workgroup was intrigued by
Anchorage’s program and invited Municipal prosecutor Seneca Theno to
explain the program and discuss its impact. Some data was presented,
mostly in the form of estimated numbers of program participants and
total yearly amounts of collected fines, but hard numbers were
unavailable as there was no ongoing organized data collection occurring
and the program had never been evaluated. 60
The authors of this paper were invited to help provide specific data
on the program, and worked with municipal prosecutors during the
summer of 2015 to collect and assess initial information about the
program. We embarked on a phased approach wherein phase one would
track general information for three months to provide a “snapshot” of the
program. Phase one’s snapshot provides information on the total number
of people offered pretrial diversion, those who accepted and rejected the
offer, those who successful completed their pretrial diversion obligations,
demographic information about these groups, and the amount of time
expended on each case collected to help predict resource savings. Phase
two will take the findings of phase one and seek grant funding to provide
a deeper review and follow program participants over time to determine
the effects, if any, of successful participation.
Data collection for phase one employed a convenience sampling
methodology. That is, all offenders who were eligible for and were offered
pretrial diversion during the data collection period were included in the
sample. Program effectiveness for phase one considered whether: (1) the
program is administered as designed (offers are made and carried out as
set forth in the municipal code); (2) participants are successfully
completing the program requirements and are diverted from the system;
(3) bias or discrimination exists regarding who has access to the program;
and (4) the program is a cost savings measure for the municipal and state
government. Measures of cost-savings equated with financial success
59. ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N WORKGROUP ON SENTENCING
ALTERNATIVES, STAFF NOTES OF SNOWDEN CONFERENCE CENTER MEETING 1–2 (Dec.
18,
2014),
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/meetingsummaries/workgroup/sentencing-alternatives/12-18-14.pdf.
60. See id.
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consisted of revenue generated through fines collected by the program
and the estimated timesaving for prosecutors and the court. These latter
estimates were gleaned by comparing time spent on cases in the pretrial
diversion program to estimates of time spent on comparable cases that do
not go through the program. Time estimates from past prosecutorial
experience were required since only two of the ninety-one closed cases in
which offers of pretrial diversion were made declined participation.
The municipal prosecutor’s office collected data on all defendants
offered pretrial diversion from June to August 2015. It was estimated that
the municipal prosecutor’s office offered pretrial diversion to an average
of five defendants per day, for an estimated twenty-five offers per week.
Based on the twelve weeks of data collection, we estimated that data on
300 defendants would be collected. Data collection points included case
characteristics (e.g., sanction, completion, outcome), dates for each point
in the process of pretrial diversion, and participant demographics. As of
August 31, 2015, the end of the data collection period, the actual sample
size was 148 cases. Of these 148 cases, the outcome results include data on
the ninety-one closed cases in the sample.
A.

Acceptance Rate and Offense Categories of Defendants Offered
Pretrial Diversion

Of the defendants offered pretrial diversion, 98%, or eighty-nine of
the ninety-one closed cases, accepted the offer. Thus, it appears that
pretrial diversion is very attractive to those charged with minor offenses.
The four most common offenses, accounting for 93% of those defendants
that accepted pretrial diversion, were driving without insurance (53%),
theft over fifty dollars (24%), theft under fifty dollars (12%), and
misconduct involving a controlled substance in the sixth degree (4%).
Tables 1–3 outline the number of defendants with closed and open
cases of pretrial diversion, the number of defendants that accepted
pretrial diversion, and the categories of charges associated with the
defendants whose pretrial diversion case was closed at the end of the data
collection period.

34.1 ARTICLE - LEPAGE & MAY (DO NOT DELETE)

5/1/2017 2:22 PM

2017 THE ANCHORAGE PRETRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM 13
STATUS PTD
STATUS
Closed

REASON

TOTAL
91

PTD Successful
No BW or continuances

82
61

PTD Complete But
BW involved after acceptance of PTD
BW involved after acceptance of PTD
offer and additional continuances
granted
BW involved before acceptance of PTD
offer
BW involved before acceptance of PTD
offer and after accepting PTD
Continuances (1), no BW
Rejected initially by defendant but
allowed into PTD later
PTD Unsuccessful
Allowed into PTD, but ultimately pled
out to underlying charge
Rejected by Defendant
By way of BW at OCA or other reason,
and not allowed to participate later
Dismissed for various reasons
Before PTD offer or acceptance

5
4
4
1
5
2

5

2

2
Table 1a: Open Pretrial Diversion Case Counts. Legend: BW: Bench
Warrant, OCA: Out of Custody Arraignment, PTD: Pretrial
Diversion.
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REASON
STATUS PTD
STATUS
Open
Accepted into PTD and now awaiting completion

TOTAL
57
13

Rejected by Defendant

BW

By way of BW at OCA or other reason, and
not
allowed
to
participate
later
Prosecution ongoing

6
38

Bench Warrants and NEVER IN PTD. PTD
would have been offered but defendants
failed to show up for OCAs (For JW
purposes, these cases are listed as PTD
rejected, but they may be given PTD at next
OCA if they show up to it)
Bench Warrants and accepted into PTD,
but then got subsequent BW (For JW
purposes, these cases are listed as PTD
accepted and PTD rejected at BW)
TOTAL OPEN AND CLOSED

2

17
148

Table 1b: Open Pretrial Diversion Case Counts. Legend: BW: Bench
Warrant, JW: Justice Ware Software used by Anchorage Municipal
Prescutors Office, OCA: Out of Custody Arraignment, PTD:
Pretrial Diversion.
Tables 1a and 1b outline the status of all 148 cases. Further analyses
on the measures of success were done on the ninety-one cases that were
completed and closed by the end of the data collection period on August
31, 2015. Table 1b additionally shows the status of the open cases at the
end of the data collection period. The tables detail the range of significant
events or reasons for the status of closed and open cases, such as a bench
warrant being issued at some point during the defendant’s time in the
pretrial diversion program. These reasons are listed as described by the
prosecutor collecting the data for the evaluation.
Analysis was done to concisely show the number defendants that
were offered pretrial diversion and the number of defendants that
accepted the offer. As already mentioned, in the ninety-one closed cases
that data were collected on, a significant percentage of defendants, 98%
(n=89), accepted the offer. While the number of defendants who accepted
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pretrial diversion offers is not itself a measure of program success, it does
indirectly suggest that the option is appealing. Still, multiple reasons may
explain the high acceptance rate, and fully discerning these reasons
would likely require participant interviews or surveys. One possibility is
that defendants view the diversionary obligations as small and
insignificant compared to what they perceive may be required if they are
found guilty of their charged offense in court. Alternatively, the incentive
of having the case dismissed and avoiding a conviction on their record
may be the primary motivating factor.
Offense Category/Charge
Offense
Category
DWOI
Theft Under
$50
Theft Over
$50
MICS 6

f

%

48

52.7

11

12.1

22

24.2

4

4.4

CDM

1

1.1

HAR

2

2.2

D/wSDO

1

1.1

DPU21

1

1.1

Trespass

1

1.1

Total
91
100.0
Table 2: Offense Category and Charge
Table 2 describes the offenses and charges of the sample of closed
cases facing defendants who were offered pretrial diversion. Defendants
who were offered pretrial diversion were charged with relatively minor
offenses. This parallels the parameters of eligibility requirements of the
pretrial diversion program for minor non-violent offenses. The vast
majority of defendants, 93%, were charged with one of four modal crimes
in ascending order: (1) driving without insurance (DWOI); (2) theft under
fifty dollars; (3) theft over fifty dollars; and (4) misconduct involving a
controlled substance in the sixth degree (i.e., Anchorage Municipal Code
Section 9.28.303(A)) (MICS 6). The prosecutor’s office stated that in most
cases the controlled substance indicated in this charge is marijuana. The
remaining charges include: contributing to the delinquency of a minor
(CDM), under Anchorage Municipal Code Section 8.50.050(A)(1); hit and
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run leaving the scene of a crash (HAR), under Anchorage Municipal Code
Section 9.10.020(C); driving a motor vehicle with a screen device
operating (D/wSDO); purchase or delivery to persons under the age of
twenty-one or access of persons under the age of twenty-one to licensed
premises (DPU21), under Anchorage Municipal Code Section
8.53.416.060; and trespass.
B.

Demographic Variations among Defendants Offered Pretrial
Diversion

Demographic variables were collected and analyzed on the ninetyone defenders who accepted the offer of pretrial diversion and whose
cases were closed by the end of the data collection period. There was no
variation between the number of males (56%) and number of females
(44%) that pretrial diversion was offered, and no variation between males
(56%) and females (44%) that accepted the offer of pretrial diversion. In
the two cases where defendants did not accept the pretrial diversion offer,
one defendant was male and one was female.
Pretrial diversion was offered and accepted by defendants who
tended to be relatively young, with 85% between the ages of eighteen to
forty years old. Defendants twenty-one to forty years old were the most
common age group to whom pretrial diversion was offered and accepted,
comprising 48% of offers and 49% of acceptances, followed by defendants
aged eighteen to twenty years old with 37% of offers and 38% of
acceptances.
The racial composition of defendants offered pretrial diversion and
those who accepted the offer was most commonly Caucasian (57% of
offers and 56% of acceptances respectively). No differences existed
between how many defendants were offered and subsequently accepted
the offer of pretrial diversion for the next largest racial groups: American
Indians/Alaska Natives (14%), African American (9%), and Asian/Pacific
Islander (8%). The defendants’ race was either unknown or not indicated
in 10% of the data.
The majority of defendants in the pretrial diversion program did not
have any prior convictions (90% of those offered pretrial diversion and
91% of those that accepted pretrial diversion, respectively). Defendants
had a prior conviction in only 9% of offers and 8% of acceptances. This
supports the program prescripts of defendant eligibility: the Anchorage
Municipal Pretrial Diversion program has a target population of lowlevel first time offenders. The high degree of defendants without a prior
criminal conviction demonstrates efficacy in the program being
implemented and applied as it was designed. The data also demonstrate
the eligibility restrictions’ flexibility because defendants with a criminal
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conviction made up 9% of those who were offered pretrial diversion and
8% of those who accepted such offers. This shows that pretrial diversion
attorneys used discretion in evaluating whether a defendant was still a
good candidate for pretrial diversion despite a criminal conviction. It is
plausible that the criminal convictions of those defendants who were
offered and accepted pretrial diversion were for minor offenses, thus
qualifying them as good candidates in spite of prior convictions.
Variable

Mean/Percentage

Anchorage Population
Estimate

22.0

32.6

Male

56.0

50.8

Female

44.0

49.2

Caucasian

57.1

66.0

African American

8.8

5.6

14.3

7.9

Age
Gender

Race

American
Indian/Alaska Native
Asian/Pacific Islander

7.7
10.1
Table 3: Pretrial Defendants Compared to Population Estimates: Age
used was median. Source: Municipal Pretrial Diversion Evaluation,
American Community Survey 2010-2014 Estimates.

When the group of defendants that accepted pretrial diversion was
compared to the population estimates for the Municipality of Anchorage,
some demographic differences emerged. Those in pretrial diversion had
a median age of twenty-two, compared to a median age of thirty-seven in
the general population. The pretrial defendants were more likely to be
males than females (56% compared to 44%) than the Anchorage
population (51% compared to 49%). For racial composition of the pretrial
defendants compared to the Anchorage population, Caucasians were
underrepresented (57% compared to 66%), as were Asian/Pacific
Islanders (8% compared to 10%). By contrast, American Indian/Alaska
Natives were overrepresented in the pretrial diversion group by a factor
of 45% (14% compared to 8%) and African Americans were
overrepresented by a factor of 36% (9% compared to 6%). In other words,
there were fewer Caucasian and Asian/Pacific Islanders in the pretrial
diversion program as compared to the Anchorage population, and there
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were more American Indian/Alaska Native and African American
offenders in the pretrial diversion program than in the Anchorage
population.
C.

Conditions of Pretrial Diversion
Conditions of PTD
f

%

Fine

81

89.0

CWS

8

8.8

N/A (due to defendant
failing to show to OCA)

2

2.2

Total

91

100.0

Table 4: Conditions of Pretrial Diversion
Table 4 outlines the frequency and percentage of the conditions of
pretrial diversion for those who were offered and accepted the offer of
pretrial diversion during the data collection period. As stated previously,
fines comprised nearly 90% of the conditions imposed, with community
work service assigned to a much smaller percentage of cases, 9%. The
Municipal Prosecutor reported that all but one of the fines was set at $250,
and community work service was set at forty hours. The data and
completion rates demonstrate that most participants in the pretrial
diversion program preferred a small monetary fine to time spent doing
community service.
Descriptive analysis was completed on the pretrial sanctions for
those defendendants who completed the conditions of pretrial diversion
during the data collection period. By far the most common completed
condition was payment of a fine (93%) compared to those who completed
a condition of community work service (7%). Outside of the discussion of
the amount of time saved by municipal attorneys and the judiciary via the
use of pretrial diversion, this demonstrates a successful measure of the
Anchorage Municipal Pretrial Diversion program in revenue generation.
If the most common fine amount was $250 and seventy-six defendants
completed the financial condition of pretrial diversion, a rough estimate
of $19,000 was generated in a three-month period. Additionally, it can be
estimated that, during the data collection period, the Anchorage
Municipal Pretrial Diversion program generated 240 hours of community
service.
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D.

Length of Time for Pretrial Diversion Processes

Participants were typically given about a month to complete their
diversion obligations. The pretrial diversion process was relatively short,
averaging twenty-four days from pretrial acceptance by the defendant to
the date of satisfaction of the conditions. Additionally, most defendants
satisfied their conditions earlier than required with an average of nine
days before the completion due date. The longest part of the process was
an average of thirty-one days between the date of offense and screening
for pretrial diversion.
Table 5 shows the average amount of time that elapsed for the
pretrial defendants at each procedural stage in the pretrial diversion
process. Time spent by both defendants and attorneys for each point in
the pretrial diversion process illustrates the variation in time estimates.
Time Point in PTD Processes
Date PTD
Date of
Screening
Accepted to
Offense to
Date to
Date PTD
Screening
Date PTD
Completed
Date
Offered
N
Mean
Std.
Deviation
Range

Date PTD
Offered to
Date PTD
Accepted

63
24.4762

82
31.6220

82
9.0000

82
6.6829

21.11402

57.25698

40.80547

36.25148

147.00
395.00
388.00
301.00
Time Point in PTD Processes, Continued
Date PTD
Due Date
Outcome
Date PTD
Accepted to
for PTD
Date to
Completed
Due Date for Agreement
Date PTD
to Date
PTD
Completion Completed
Case
Agreement
to Outcome
Closed
Completion
Date
81
79
62
62
35.5802
9.7700
0.4194
3.2903

N
Mean
Std.
19.12777
12.16694
3.30200
5.60265
Deviation
Range
142.00
41.00
26.00
35.00
Table 5: Procedural Time Lengths for Pretrial Diversion Processes

As stated above, Table 5 shows the relative swiftness of case
processing as a measure of success for the Anchorage Municipal Pretrial
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Diversion program. The mean time (measured in days) spent during the
different process points of the program are highlighted. As shown, offers
of and conditions of the pretrial program are closed rather than openended, with an average of twenty-four days spent from the date pretrial
diversion was accepted until the date that the conditions were satisfied.
The time between the date of the offense and the time that a municipal
attorney screens the case for pretrial eligibility was on average thirty-one
days, and only nine days from the time the case was screened until the
day that the offer of pretrial diversion was made. On average, defendants
took six days to accept an offer of pretrial diversion. Once accepted,
defendants were offered about thirty-five days to complete the conditions
of pretrial diversion, most often by either paying a fine or completing
community service. Most notably, many defendants took much less time
than offered to complete the conditions of pretrial diversion: just nine
days. While the twenty-four day average from PTD acceptance to PTD
completion accounts for the days between court hearings, the nine-day
average in completing conditions of PTD is a more precise measure of the
number of days, on average, that defendants completed the conditions of
PTD between hearings. This demonstrates the swiftness or success of
pretrial diversion in attaining compliance. Once the conditions for pretrial
diversion were satisfied, it took an average of three days for the municipal
prosecutor’s office to close the case. Taken as a whole, this mechanism of
case diversion is a much quicker process for the defendants, prosecution,
defense attorneys, and the court system than traditional case processing.
E.

Number of Court Hearings and Estimated Time Spent

The Anchorage Municipal Pretrial Diversion Program appears to be
very efficient for prosecuting attorneys based on the number of court
hearings attended and the amount of time devoted to each case. Eightythree percent of the cases were closed within two court hearings and
almost nine out of ten, 89%, of the cases required less than one hour of
case processing time by the prosecuting attorney.
Tables 6 and 7 describe the number of court hearings for the eightytwo defendants that successfully completed the conditions of pretrial
diversion during the data collection period. Additionally, estimates of
time spent are detailed for each court hearing, and estimates of total time
spent for the entire case by the prosecutor is listed.
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Number of Court Hearings
f
%
0
1
1.2
1
24
29.3
2
44
53.7
3
9
11.0
4
2
2.4
5
1
1.2
8
1
1.2
Total
82
100.0
Table 6: Number of Court Hearings
Table 6 extends the findings of efficiency in case processing as
reported in the previous table from the perspective of the municipal
attorneys handling pretrial diversion cases. The majority of pretrial cases
(83%) required only one or two court hearings to be processed.
Additionally, the time of the municipal prosecutors was efficiently used
with an average of less than one hour (51.3 minutes) spent for each of the
two court hearings.
Estimated Time Spent on Case
(In Hours)
f
%
0.50
3
3.7
0.75
58
70.7
1.00
12
14.6
1.25
5
6.1
1.50
2
2.4
1.75
1
1.2
2.15
1
1.2
Total
82
100.0
Table 7: Estimated Time Spent on Case
Table 7 demonstrates another measurement of time efficiency for
municipal prosecutors with the use of pretrial diversion. Nearly nine out
of ten (89%) cases used one hour or less of municipal prosecutors’ time
for case processing. Without pretrial diversion, it could reasonably be
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estimated that municipal prosecutors would spend more than one hour
on each case in traditional adjudicatory processing. 61

III. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The initial assessment of the Anchorage pretrial diversion program
consisted of a three-month program “snapshot” to determine how often
the option was utilized and offer data about the cases and the participants.
During the three-month period, 148 people charged with municipal law
violations in Anchorage were offered a pretrial diversion alternative
wherein if they paid a $250 fine or served forty hours of community work
service within a month their charges would be dismissed. At the close of
the three-month period, ninety-one of these cases had either been
dismissed or resulted in convictions. These cases became the sample for
this assessment. Program effectiveness focused on the following:
(1) Whether the program is administered as designed (as set forth in
the Municipal Code);
(2) Whether participants are successfully completing the program
requirements and diverted from the system;
(3) Whether bias or discrimination is present in who has access to the
program; and
(4) Whether the program is a cost savings measure for the municipal
and state governments.
The Anchorage pretrial diversion program is being operated as
designed and set forth in the Anchorage Municipal Code. 62 Municipal
prosecutors review cases for program eligibility prior to arraignment. All
of the cases in the sample were offers extended to those who had
committed non-violent misdemeanors that were not otherwise barred
from the program by the Municipal Code. 63 Ninety percent of the
participants had no prior criminal history. These two findings align with
the program’s stated mission,a diversionary alternative to low level, first
time misdemeanors. Yet at the same time, some discretionary flexibility is
intended and is apparent in what we observed. For instance, by design
not everyone who commits a low-level misdemeanor automatically gets
an offer to participate. No one is guaranteed participation as the decision

61. Id. at 57; Interview with Seneca Theno, Municipal Prosecutor,
Municipality of Anchorage (Nov. 13, 2015) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Theno Interview].
62. Anchorage Mun. Code § 08.05.060 (2016).
63. Prosecutors may offer diversion in theft cases up to $500 and other
misdemeanors that do not involve crimes against persons, crimes against minors,
weapons violations, driving under the influence, gambling, and prostitution. Id.
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remains within prosecutors’ discretion. 64 About 10% of the participants
were not first time offenders, demonstrating that some discretionary
decision-making took place in screening decisions. Pretrial obligations
also matched program design. A fine or community work service was
required in each case, aligning with the fine and community work service
schedule set forth in the Anchorage Municipal Code. 65 Fines were much
more common than community work service. Further research should
explore whether this frequency demonstrates a preference by the
prosecution or the Municipality to assign a fine instead of community
work service, or instead whether it reflects the participants’ preferences.
The program appears appealing, as evidenced by the vast majority
of people who were offered and accepted participation. Of the ninety-one
closed cases where an offer was made, eighty-nine defendants accepted
the offer and eighty-two of those individuals successfully paid their fine
or completed their community work service within the time limit. On
average, these participants even completed their obligation nine days
before their given deadline.
The initial outcome assessment demonstrated positive results by
accruing savings, both in money and time, and diverting defendants out
of the criminal adjudication process. Eighty-three percent of the cases
were closed within two court hearings and almost nine out of ten (89%)
of the cases used less than one hour of case processing time by the
prosecuting attorney. Because offers are accepted at the arraignment
stage, there is no need to appoint government paid defense counsel,
which results in further savings. Many of these cases would qualify for a
public defender if actively prosecuted beyond arraignment.
Because the number of those who were offered but who
subsequently failed to complete was so small in our sample, we
questioned municipal prosecutors for some estimates about comparable
cases that are actively prosecuted by the office either because the
defendant was not offered pretrial diversion or because the defendant
declined the offer. 66 By way of example, those charged with driving
without insurance (DWOI) who wish to challenge their charges get a
defense attorney appointed. If they are not offered or do not accept
pretrial diversion at arraignment, then the case is placed in pretrial
conference status with a pretrial conference hearing every week until
either trial or a plea is entered at a later change of plea hearing. On
64. Frequently Asked Questions—Pretrial Diversion, MUN. OF ANCHORAGE,
http://www.muni.org/Departments/legal/criminal/Pages/PreTrialDiversion.
aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2017); see also Anchorage Mun. Code § 08.05.060
(describing the discretionary nature of the program).
65. See Anchorage Mun. Code § 08.05.060.
66. Theno Interview, supra note 61.

34.1 ARTICLE - LEPAGE & MAY (DO NOT DELETE)

24

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

5/1/2017 2:22 PM

Vol. 34:1

average there would be three pretrial conference hearings and two change
of plea hearings for each of these cases because continuances are often
requested and granted during hearings. For each pretrial conference
hearing, the prosecution spends anywhere from five to fifteen minutes
pulling the file and preparing for the hearing and three to four hours
attending weekly hearings. Each pretrial conference hearing for a
particular defendant is short, ranging from forty-five seconds to five
minutes, but because all the pretrial conferences are scheduled together,
and there is no set order, the time spent in aggregate at the hearing(s) that
day may be three to four hours. Changing plea hearings are comparable,
because hearings are lumped together on the court calendar and can take
one to two hours in total, even though only five to seven minutes is spent
on any one case. Prosecutors and public defenders attend these docketed
pretrial conference and change of plea hearings with multiple cases to be
addressed, but one can quickly extrapolate the mounting time and energy
spent on any one DWOI case by the prosecution, defense counsel, and the
court in having to churn these files and address them at such hearings.
Many more resources are used than when compared to those successfully
diverted through pretrial diversion.
Additionally, fines and community work service are generated at the
front end of the process instead of the back end. According to municipal
prosecutors, the typical sanction for a DWOI case that is not resolved
through pretrial diversion is a $500 fine with $250 suspended, thirty days
jail with all thirty days suspended, two years of probation, and a $50
surcharge. In other words, the typical penalty is a $250 fine and probation.
This raises the question: why not just try to collect this at the front end
before expending extra time and energy? When asked how often these
defendants sentenced for DWOI actually pay their fine, the response was
that the Municipality does a “pretty good job” at fine collection because
they have a very effective collections effort. 67 But again, such efforts
require time, money, and energy.
Ultimately, the pretrial diversion program saves time for justice
system agencies involved with minor criminal defendants—time that can
be more efficiently directed towards involvement and processing of more
serious criminal defendants. The agencies that directly benefit from
timesaving include the Municipal Prosecutors Office, the State of Alaska
Public Defenders Office, and the Anchorage District and Superior Courts.
Additionally, the defendants benefit from timesaving of diversion
rather than the process involved with traditional adjudication. Quite
often, criminal cases impose an arduous time requirement for defendants
(e.g., court hearings, continuances) that is commonly viewed as more
67. Id.
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burdensome than the adjudication process itself. Defendants often have
to take time off from work to appear at court, may have to find childcare
and transportation, and are often unaware of court locations and
proceedings. This makes the process of court adjudication seem more
burdensome than a sentencing. 68 This may make pretrial diversion more
attractive to defendants, and may explain why it was so readily accepted
when offered in Anchorage.
The program appears to be facially nondiscriminatory. The number
of males and females who received offers is closely aligned with their
given proportions in Anchorage. No minority groups appear to be left
out, although Pacific Islanders were slightly underrepresented. In fact,
Alaska Natives and African Americans were overrepresented in our
sample.
These positive outcomes are particularly important considering that
this is the first outcome assessment done of the Anchorage Pretrial
Diversion Program and demonstrates the need for a more comprehensive
evaluation. Determining the effectiveness of pretrial diversion as a
resource saving alternative is important due to Alaska’s fiscal constraints.
Limitations of Research
This first phase, the initial outcome assessment of the Anchorage
Pretrial Diversion Program, is not without limitations. Due to the
sampling methodology, the sample should not be construed as
representative of all defendants who are offered or accept the offer of
pretrial diversion. Also, because the sample size is small, caution should
be used in interpreting the findings. This initial phase aimed to ascertain
baseline estimates on the number of defendants in the program, their
characteristics (e.g., types of offenses, demographics, and program
completion), and program characteristics (e.g., types of conditions,
completion rates, and duration to completion). The design of the next
phase of the evaluation can address the limitations of small sample size
and non-representativeness associated with this phase. The use of
random sampling in the methodology, with control and comparison
groups, would lead to a representative and generalizable sample by
which stronger inferences could be made from the data. A more robust
methodology would lead to more confidence in any policy implications.
Additionally, using both quantitative and qualitative research methods
would increase confidence in the research, lending more credence to any
policy recommendations. Interviews with defendants centered on their
68. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 154–98 (1992).
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perceptions of the benefits and challenges of the program would produce
richer qualitative data about the Anchorage Pretrial Diversion Program.
While this first phase shows promising results in terms of the efficacy of
the Anchorage Pretrial Diversion Program, stronger research design in
the subsequent phases will do well to validate these preliminary findings.

